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NOTES
to be good law and might certainly be a helpful rule if there were
any evidence in the cases as to what the nature of these powers
must be. From the opinions in Newton County Fruit Growers
Association v. Southern Railway and Ruggles v. Iron Workers As-
sociation it appears that these powers must be derived from the
statutes and that the statutes must be pleaded before the suability
attribute will attach. With Clark v. Grand Lodge as a precedent it
can be said that an association which has made a contract of in-
surance is a suable entity in so far as the association may be sued
upon that contract. Whether a suit or an ordinary contract
would be allowed seems doubtful in view of the decision in Ruggles
v. Iron Workers Association. The opinion in the case of Clark V.
Grand Lodge shows a reluctance to recognize an unincorporated
association as a suable entity for purpose of a suit in nature of a
tort. However, it is submitted that allowing such a suit would
not be without precedent. 31
To-day there are many unincorporated associations, such as the
labor unions. They have thousands of members, are efficiently
organized, hold valuable property and large sums of money, and
conduct business in furtherance of the ends of the organization.
The need for a practical method of suing these groups as entities
is self-evident. The Missouri Courts have met this situation only
partially, but effectively in some instances.
LESTER E. BARRETT '33.
ENLARGEMENT OF LIFE ESTATES TO FEES SIMPLE BY
THE ANNEXATION OF A POWER
There seems to be a great deal of learned argument on the part
of the courts and the authorities in the State of Missouri as to the
status of executory limitations. It has been suggested by Mr.
McCune Gill 1 that there is a "remarkable body of law" on the sub-
ject in this state. "An analysis of these elements in these forty-
nine cases shows that it is quite impossible to deduce a rule from
the decisions. The limitations seem to have been upheld or dis-
regarded and the supposed intention of the testator or grantor
a1 Consider the case of State v. Kansas City Stock Exchange note 9, supra.
See also Wiechtuechter v. Miller note 16 supra.
Professor Sturgis suggests in an article found in 33 Yale Law Journal 383
(1924) that the power to sue or be sued in their association name is denied
the unincorporated groups not because they have no legal entity separate and
distinct from their members, but because the courts feel the power is usurped
from the corporate franchise, which must lie in grant from the sovereign.
'A Limitation After a Fee Simple (1927) pamphlet written by McCune
Gill and published by the Title Insurance Corporation of St. Louis.
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declared at random." 2 In this view he is partially supported by
Professor Hudson 3, who speaks of "the vacillation in the decisions
of the Supreme Court on the question as to whether the first taker
has a life estate with the limitation over good as a remainder."
However, it seems to the writer that this view is not entirely cor-
rect. There are several problems which must be carefully dis-
tinguished in order to arrive at a full appreciation of the authori-
ties in this state.
Neither weeds out the cases involving the problem of the en-
largement of life estates, and it is submitted that the following
review of the subject will show that a great deal of the alleged
confusion in the cases is attributable to this. There are several
factors to be observed before the problem can be clearly per-
ceived. In this type of cases there are three interests involved,
the primary estate-that estate granted or devised to the first
taker-, the subsequent estate-that estate set up by the limitation
over-, and the power of disposition given to the first taker. Both
Mr. Gill and Professor Hudson base their analyses largely upon
the fate of the subsequent estate-the limitation over. It is sub-
mitted that the real point of departure is that estate which is first
in order of enjoyment. If that estate can be established and its
nature truthfully determined, the disposition of the subsequent
estate follows as a logical incident thereto. If the primary estate
is one for life, then the subsequent estate will be a remainder
either vested or contingent; and this group of precedents can be
set apart in its proper category. The remaining cases will be
found to have involved primary estates which were held to be
fees and as to them the subsequent limitation can only be sus-
tained, if at all, as an executory limitation. In the latter instance
the question is not whether all executory limitations are to be held
valid or invalid, but whether an executory limitation can be con-
ditioned to arise upon the contingency of non-disposition of the
property by the holder of the fee. Consequently, this note will
be devoted to a discussion of the problems involved in determining
the nature of the primary estate. Unfortunately limitations of
space will not permit of a discussion of the second question.4
I. IN GENERAL
(A) THE MAJORITY RULE
The great majority of the cases support the view that where an
estate for life is given, with a remainder over, and a power of dis-
2 Ibid. 1. c. p. 2.
3Executory Limitations in Missouri (1916) 11 Mo. L. Bull. 50.
4 The Missouri decisions reduce considerably the importance of this prob-
lem by their tendency to construe the estate granted to be a life estate.
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position of the fee is annexed the limitation for the life of the
first taker will control, and the life estate will not be enlarged to
a fee, notwithstanding the power of the life tenant to dispose of
the fee.5 In an Illinois case the court stated the rule in the fol-
lowing language: "It is the rule that where a will devises a life
estate with general language indicating a power of disposal, al-
though the life tenant could dispose of the estate devised without
the express power, the power is regarded as only pertaining to
the estate devised, and is interpreted as meaning such disposal
as the life tenant could make. . . . If, however, the will indicates
an intention to confer power to convey a fee, effect will be given
to such intention, but the existence of the power will not enlarge
the life estate into a fee." Of course this raises the question as
to the interpretation of the scope of the power, but inasmuch as the
rule is clear and the matter is merely one of interpretation of the
language in the deed or will, the main problem still involves cases
wherein the power is deemed to include authority to convey a fee.
In Peckham v. Lego 7 the will contained a devise to a man and
his wife of, "the use and enjoyment of the whole of the remainder
of the estate of which I may die possessed both real and personal
during their natural lives. Should it be necessary for their per-
sonal comfort to use any portion of said property, it is my will
that they do so exercising good judgment and saving as much of
it as possible for the children born to them." In deciding that
only a life estate was created the court said, "The language is
doubly restrictive. In the first place the bequest is guarded by
5 Brant v. Virginia Coal & I. Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 326; Glover v. Stilson
(1888) 56 Conn. 316, 15 Atl. 752; Adams v. Lillibridge (1901) 73 Conn. 655,
49 Atl. 21; Mathis v. Glamson (1920) 149 Ga. 752, 102 S. E. 351; Funk v.
Eggleston (1879) 92 Ill. 515; Mann v. Martin (1898) 172 Ill. 18, 49 N. E.
706; Powers v. Wells (1910) 244 Ill. 558, 91 N. E. 717; South v. South (1883)
91 Ind. 221; Booher v. Deane (1928) 88 Ind. App. 72, 163 N. E. 287; Hamilton
v. Hamilton (1908) 140 Iowa 282, 115 N. W. 1012 rehearing denied (1908)
140 Iowa 285, 118 N. E. 375; Greenwalt v. Kellar (1907) 75 Kan. 578, 90
Pac. 233; Payne v. Johnson (1893) 95 Ky. 175, 24 S. W. 238; Pickering v.
Langdon (1843) 22 Me. 413; Loud v. Poland (1927) 126 Me. 45, 136 Atl.
119; Smith v. Hardesty (1898) 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788; Cowman v. Classen
(1929) 156 Md. 428, 144 Atl. 367; Rail v. Dotson (Miss. 1850) 14 S. & M. 176;
Krause v. Krause (1924) 113 Neb. 22, 201 N. W. 670; Lord v. Roberts (N. H.
1931) 153 Atl. 1; Cory v. Cory (1883) 37 N. J. Eq. 198; Patrick v. Morehead
(1881) 85 N. C. 62; Helms v. Collins (1930) 200 N. C. 89, 156 S. E. 152; Fet-
ter v. Rettig (1918) 98 Ohio St. 428, 121 N. E. 696; Henninger v. Henninger
(1902) 202 Pa. 207,51 Atl. 749; Wagnon v. Wagnon (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 16
S. W. (2d) 366; Re Tilton (1899) 21 R. I. 426, 44 Atl. 223; Re Hayward
(1919) 93 Vt. 404, 108 Atl. 345; Porter v. Wheeler (1924) 131 Wash. 482, 230
Pac. 640.
6 Barton v. Barton (1918) 283 Ill. 338, 119 N. E. 320.
7 (1889) 57 Conn. 553, 19 Atl. 392.
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the words 'use and enjoyment', which alone would distinguish
the gift from a fee, but, to put it beyond all controversy the tenure
of the holding is expressly given as 'during their natural lives'.
If the section stopped here it is conceded that a doubt as to the
meaning would be impossible; but the words which follow 'Should
it be necessary . . . to use any of the property it is my will that
they should do so . . .' it is contended, remove the restriction
twice applied, and enlarge what was plainly a life estate and con-
vert it into a fee. We fail to discover any such intention . . .
this clause was never intended to sweep away the life estate." It
is obvious that the court in this case felt that it was following the
intention of the testator, a procedure which is certainly a cardinal
rule in the construction of wills. This is certainly the accepted
view of the casps where there is a devise of a life estate in express
terms.8
However, in a great many instruments there is no express
grant of a life estate. In fact the primary interest is limited in
terms which, if they stood alone might be construed as conveying
a fee. Thus the court is faced primarily with a problem of
construction. For instance, in an Illinois case 9 the court was
called upon to determine the nature of an interest created by the
following provision in a will: "I give, devise and bequeath, to
my wife . . . all of my property . . . , with full power to convey
and dispose of same in any way she may see fit. . . ." While the
words used are sufficient to convey a fee, and this would be their
effect standing alone, the court felt that when this clause was
construed with the following clause---"It is my will that whatever
8 To quote the devise in such cases would be mere reiteration. The fol-
lowing cases involve devises of life estates in such words as "for life", "for
widowhood or until death", etc. Funk v. Eggleston (1879) 92 Ill. 515; Skin-
ner v. McDowell (1897) 169 Ill. 365, 48 N. E. 310; Mann v. Martin (1898)
172 Ill. 18, 49 N. E. 706; Powers v. Wells (1910) 244 Ill. 558, 91 N. E. 717;
Wiley v. Gregory (1893) 135 Ind. 647, 35 N. E. 507; Rusk v. Luck (1896)
147 Ind. 388, 45 N. E. 691; Bryson v. Hicks (1922) 78 Ind. App. 111, 134
N. E. 874; Booker v. Deane (1928) 88 Ind. App. 72, 163 N. E. 287; Graham
v. Sinclair (1929) 89 Ind. App. 119, 165 N. E. 768; Paxton v. Paxton (1909)
141 Iowa 96, 119 N. W. 284; Olson v. Weber (1922) 194 Iowa 512, 187 N. E.
465; Hicks v. Connor (1925) 210 Ky. 773, 276 S. W. 844; Evans v. Leer
(1930) 232 Ky. 358, 23 S. W. (2d) 553; Lickteig v. Lickteig (1931) 236 Ky.
540, 33 S. W. (2d) 641; Pickering v. Langdon (1843) 22 Me. 413; Mallet v.
Hall (1930) 129 Me. 148, 150 Atl. 531; Lord v. Roberts (N. H. 1931) 153
Atl. 1; Stafford v. Washburn (1913) 208 N. Y. 536, 101 N. E. 1122; Helms
v. Collins (1930) 200 N. C. 89, 156 S. E. 152; Kiplinger v. Armstrong (1930)
34 Ohio App. 348, 171 N. E. 245; Stiffler v. Pa. Coal & Coke Co. (1929) 289
Pa. 152, 148 AtI. 71; Arrington v. McDaniel (Tex. Comm. of App. 1929) 14
S. W. (2d) 1009. See also cases footnote 5.
9 Williams v. Elliott (1910) 246 Ill. 548, 92 N. E. 960.
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property remains at the death of my wife shall go to my four
sisters."-it clearly appeared that the testator intended to create
only a life estate in the widow. A similar situation arose in an
Indiana case.' 0 The court held that the primary estate was for
life saying, "This is not a case where a fee simple has been granted
in clear and concise language, and afterwards taken away or
modified by a subsequent clause in the will which is repugnant to
such devise in fee. The fee was not given, in the first instance, in
clear and concise language. We have given force to all the
language used in disposition of the property . . . and construed
as a whole, it clearly expresses an intention to give the widow a
life estate, with remainder over to the heirs of the devisor." In
Barry v. Austin," the first clause of the will is, "I give devise and
bequeath . . . all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate."
It was held that a life estate was created and that the subsequent
limitation took effect in remainder subject to a complete power
of disposal given to the life tenant. In granting the primary es-
tate the testatrix did not say specifically whether a fee or a life
estate had been devised to the husband, and had the devise
stopped there with no other accompanying words a fee would have
been conveyed. 12 But the testatrix did not stop there. She went
on to give the husband complete power of disposal, which would
be unnecessary if he were holder of the fee. She also provided a
gift over. This seemed to indicate that the intention existed to
create merely a life estate with a gift over by way of remainder.
The Kansas cases are illustrative of a similar attitude. In one
case 13 it was held that a life estate with a power of disposal and
not a fee was created by the following language: "All the residue
and remainder of my estate . . . I hereby give, bequeath and de-
vise to my wife . . . to have, enjoy, sell or dispose of in any man-
ner she may see fit, or in her judgment may conduce to the interest
or value of said estate . . . (specific gifts over upon her death) ."
The court said: "The will in question is one which could be con-
strued as giving a fee simple or a mere life estate, and is one on
which legal minds might well differ each supported by abundant
authorities. To give bequeath and devise to the wife, 'to have
;; . etc.' would of itself be deemed to pass absolute title. But
when as a part of the same sentence the provision is made that
upon the devisee's death all the property be distributed as directed,
10 Eubank v. Smiley (1892) 130 Ind. 393, 29 N. E. 919.
11 Barry v. Austin (1919) 118 Me. 51, 105 Atl. 806.
12 Under the Maine statute (R. S. Me. (1925) ch. 79 sec. 16) a fee can be
conveyed in general terms without the magic words "heirs". Such statutes
exist in many states (R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 563).
13 Scott v. Gillespie (1918) 103 Kan. 745, 176 Pac. 132 cert. den. (1919)
249 U. S. 606.
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such provision is entitled to attention and consideration." In an-
other case 14 involving a very similar devise the court said, "The
language of the will is crude but easily understood. No one can
read the will and misunderstand it. The testator intended 16 that
his wife should during her life control and dispose of all prop-
erty, but that at her death that which was left undisposed of
should go to his children".
In treating of these devises in general terms the courts are
faced with a venerable rule that where an estate is given to a per-
son in general terms with a power of disposition, such gift carries
the entire estate.16 This is probably an outgrowth of the much
misconstrued dictum in Attorney General ,v. Hall17 which led to
the cases of Ide v. Ide,1s Jackson v. Bull,19 and Jackson v. Robins.20
These cases have been so fully treated by Professor Gray that it
would be a work of supererogation to do so here.21 The chief diffi-
culty with Ide v. Ide is that a careless extension of the rule may
lead to the invalidation not only of executory devises conditioned
upon non-disposition but all executory devises, however con-
ditioned. 22 This rule is obviously intended to be a rule of prop-
14 Otis v. Otis (1919) 104 Kan. 88, 177 Pac. 520.
15 Italics the author's.
"I Benesch v. Clark (1878) 49 Md. 497 (dictum). This case involves a
life estate expressly granted and it was held not to be enlarged to a fee. This
case is only one of many in which the dictum is voiced, but not applied. Cf.
Carroll v. Herring (1920) 180 N. C. 369, 104 S. E. 892. In this case the rule
is clearly stated and would seem to have the effect of creating a fee in the
primary taker. Thus, the subsequent estate could only be an executory lim-
itation, which, incidentally, the court thought would be void for repugnancy.
See also Chewning v. Mason (1912) 158 N. C. 578, 74 S. E. 357.
17 (1731) Fitzg. 314, 94 Eng. Repr. 772. Professor Gray points out that
the Mass. court misread this case in deciding Ide v. Ide (infra).
18 (1809) 5 Mass. 500.
19 (1813) 10 Johns. 19.
20 (1819) 16 Johns. 537 also reported in 15 Johns. 169.
21 Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) see. 67, et seq.
22 Leflar (1930) 8 Tenn. L. Rev. I. c. 92. The doctrine of Ide v. Ide has
been expressly repudiated in Missouri in the case of Walton v. Drumtra
(1899) 152 Mo. 489, 54 S. W. 233. Judge Marshall said "Under our statutes
and these decisions it seems clear to me that the harsh construction an-
nounced in Ide v. Ide (supra), has melted away like the hideous skeleton
in a nightmare before the Roentgen rays of common sense and the gladsome
light of modern American judicial advancement. Even in Massachusetts,
Ide v. Ide, is no longer worshipped or blindly followed". This language
seems to leave no doubt as to the learned Chief Judge's opinion of Ide v. Ide.
It is interesting to note at this point that the Missouri Supreme Court en bane,
decided the case of Walton v. Drumtra and in that case expressly overruled
the celebrated Cornwell cases (Cornwell v. Orton (1898) 126 Mo. 355, 27
S. W. 536 and Cornwell v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 542,28 S. W. 162) which held
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erty. Nevertheless a majority of the American cases adverted
in this instance to an examination of the instrument to ascertain
the intention therein expressed and have little trouble in declaring
it to be manifest that a life estate was intended. They thus ap-
ply a rule of construction rather than a rule of property. In this
group of cases there are at least two factors which have weight,
the completeness of the power and the terms of the gift over.
These factors may form the substance of a rule of property, or,
on the other hand, they may serve as the basis for a construction
of the intent of the devisor or grantor. For instance, in a recent
Kentucky case, 23 testator devised the residue of his estate to his
wife, "to use, manage, control as she wished without any re-
striction whatever, hereby investing with power to sell and con-
vey by deed or otherwise any property herein willed to her. But
when my said wife shall come to die, if she so desires, she may
give or will . . (to designated beneficiaries in determined
proportions)." It was held that the widow did not take a fee
because the power of disposition by will was not unlimited. In
the habendum of this devise, it would seem that a fee has been
granted. Furthermore in the subsequent language there is no
express gift over, whereas the power seems to be fairly complete.
If the court is applying a rule that a gift of property in general
terms coupled with a complete power of disposition carries a
fee and is determining in this case that the power falls short of
being complete enough to accomplish this result, we could say
that the court has applied a rule of property. However, from
the earlier cases 24 in this state it appears that almost all devises
coupled with a power will fall short of giving a fee because the
power in some way or other will, to the court's mind at least, be
incomplete in some detail. If testator had expressly granted a
fee-or had granted an estate in general terms and added thereto
all possible powers of disposition which attend the ownership of
a fee then we are faced with a problem of the cutting down of a
a primary devise such as those under discussion to be a fee and the subse-
quent limitation was consequently invalid as a remainder repugnant thereto.
Mr. Gill, in his analysis above referred to, cites these cases as conflicting.
23 Wintuska v. Peart (1931) 237 Ky. 666, 36 S. W. (2d) 50.
24 In Kentucky the rule is stated to be that where an estate is devised for
life expressly, or by necessary inference from the intention of the testator
as expressed in the will, a power if disposal in the devise will not enlarge the
life estate into a fee. But if the devise does not specifically or by necessary
inference create a life estate the power of disposition invests the devisee with
a fee. Goss v. Withers (1913) 153 Ky. 5, 154 S. W. 398; Mason v. Tuell
(1914) 161 Ky. 392, 170 S. W. 950. But see, Wintuska v. Peart, supra,
Angel v. Wood (1913) 153 Ky. 195, 154 S. W. 1103, and Robertson v. Robert-
son (1926) 215 Ky. 14, 284 S. W. 109. The cases seem to apply a more
liberal rule of testamentary intention. See also cases footnote 5.
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fee by the subsequent devise, not a question of enlargement.
There remains no doubt about the status of the primary estate
and we are faced with a problem of the second class referred to in
the introductory paragraphs of this note. But in any case where
there is less than a fee expressly given in the primary devise the
court must solve a problem in construction, and while it is the
completeness of the power that is being determined, it is submit-
ted that this is a matter of construction.
Language from these opinions has been quoted liberally in order
that the attitude of the court might be observed. Examples of
this sort of thing might be multiplied but they would add nothing.
Throughout the cases in the jurisdiction which follow the ma-
jority rule one finds this type of language used. It is submitted
that the implied prophecy voiced by Professor Gray in his criti-
cism of the rule in Ide v. Ide is materializing.2 In dealing with
cases in this category, a majority of the courts seem to operate
upon the words of the devise, by rule of construction, and although
the mechanics of this procedure may vary in the different juris-
dictions, the ultimate question is, "What is the nature of the pri-
mary estate?" It furthermore seems to be the tendency in a
majority, of the states to give effect to the apparent intention of
the instrument by construing the primary estate as one for life
with a power of disposition in the life tenant, and a gift over by
way of remainder, even though the primary estate has been grant-
ed in general terms rather than in the express language of a life
estate.
(B) MINORITY RULE
In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that where an absolute
power of disposition, either express or implied is annexed to a
25 Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2 ed. 1895) pp. 66-7. "The establish-
ment of this doctrine is an interesting example of what the naturalists call a
reversion to primitive type. In the barbarous stages of law courts thwart
the intention of parties to transactions by rules and restrictions which are
not based on considerations of public advantage, but are formal, arbitrary,
and often of a quasi sacred character. The process of civilization consists
in the courts endeavoring more and more to carry out the intentions of the
parties or restraining them only by rules which have their reason for ex-
istence in considerations of public policy . . . for the courts to invent a new
rule, not called for by any considerations of public policy, ... is unusual at
the present time. What are the reasons given . . . these are only words.
They merely mean that the court has set up a certain rule and that the pro-
posed provision is inconsistent with it. . . It is to be observed that the rule
is not a rule of construction, it is not a rule to carry out the intention of the
parties, but its avowed purpose is to defeat that intention."
26 Gibson v. Gibson (1921) 213 Mich. 31, 181 N. W. 41; Dills v. La Tour
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life estate in real property, the life estate is thereby enlarged to
a fee.2 6 In Burwell v. Anderson,27 which is frequently cited as
authority for this so-called minority rule, the devisee was given
the absolute disposal of 500 pounds, and the question was whether
it was a gift of money or merely a power. In that case it was
said, "And where an interest is given generally and without limi-
tation that gift is not converted into a mere power by annexing
thereto a general power of disposition. . . . But where there is
an express and inconsistent estate for life given, the construction
of that instrument is different. For an express intention nega-
tives any intention to give the absolute property, and converts
these words into words of mere power." While these views, ex-
pressed with great clearness, seem to support the majority rule
rather than the minority rule, nevertheless this case has been in-
terpreted in Virginia and the other minority states as a founda-
tion for the minority rule. The subsequent Virginia cases have
firmly established the latter doctrine. In Coffman v. CoffMan,25
the testator gave "his entire interest in the farm on which we
now live, to my wife for as long as she may live. After her death
I will and bequeath . . . (here follow specific gifts over)." It
was held that the wife took fee by reason of the annexation of a
power expressed in a subsequent sentence ". . . with my wife to
dispose of as she thinks proper." There might seem to be some
conflict in the Virginia decisions at first glance, but they are
reconcilable when the intention of the testator is taken into con-
sideration. In this jurisdiction the intention of the testator is
said to control where not in conflict with a rule of law. So in
Davis v. Kendall,29 a will was held to create a life estate merely.
The testator had devised to his wife "all my estate . . .for her
(1904) 136 Mich. 243, 98 N. W. 1004; Jones v. Jones (1872) 25 Mich. 401;
Vandeventer v. Vandeventer (1928) 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S. W. (2d) 867;
Emert v. Blair (1908) 121 Tenn. 240, 118 S. W. 865; McKnight v. McKnight
(1907) 120 Tenn. 431, 115 S. W. 134; Bradley v. Carnes (1894) 94 Tenn. 27,
27 S. W. 1007; Bristow v. Bristow (1924) 138 S. E. 67, 120 S. E. 859; Coffman
v. Coffman (1921) 131 Va. 456, 109 S. E. 454; Rolley v. Rolley (1909) 109
Va. 449, 63 S. E. 988; Burwell v. Anderson (Va. 1831) 3 Leigh 348 (there
are at least twenty additional Virginia cases in point not cited here because
of space limitation); Ogden v. Maxwell (1927) 104 W. Va. 553, 140 S. E. 554;
Meyer v. Barnett (1906) 60 W. Va. 467, 56 S. E. 206; Smith v. Schlegel
(1902) 51 W. Va. 245, 41 S. E. 161; Mulhollen v. Rice (1878) 13 W. Va. 510.
It should be noted however, that Michigan is tending away from the
minority rule. Gibson v. Gibson, supra, has been dubious authority since
Quatron v. Burton (1930) 249 Mich. 474, 229 N. W. 465.
27 (1831) 3 Leigh (Va.) 348.
28 (1921) 131 Va. 456, 109 S. E. 454.
29 (1921) 130 Va. 175, 107 S. E. 751.
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sole use and benefit so long as she lives." The court was not un-
mindful of other Virginia cases in which it had held very similar
devises to be absolute estates in fee. "This frequent reference in
the cited cases to the intention of the testator shows that the
language used is construed to pass a fee, because the words of the
testator indicate that intent." On the other hand, in Ogden v.
Maxwe1130, a devise to a widow for her natural life with full
power of disposition and an express gift over on her death, was
held to create a fee in the widow. It does not seem that these
cases are quite satisfactory. In fact, this is true of all the cases
which purport to follow the minority rule. The great trouble in
these states is that the courts must "ride two horses". They de-
sire to follow the intent of the testator on the one hand, and yet
they are reluctant to permit him to keep "his tongue in his cheek"
while making his primary devise. It seems that these courts are
allowing themselves to be governed by the terms of the power
rather than by a consideration of the effect of the primary devise.
This procedure is undoubtedly proper where the primary devise
itself is in general terms and the reference to the power is made
for purposes of determining intent-in other words, for purposes
of construing the whole instrument. But where the primary
devise expressly and unequivocally grants an estate for life, such
reference to the power is not justified. It is well settled31 that a
power carries with it no interest in land-no quantum of estate,
but is merely an authority.32
30 (1927) 104 W. Va. 553, 140 S. E. 554.
31 Melton v. Camp (1905) 121 Ga. 693, 49 S. E. 690, referring to the power
of disposal, the court said that a power was not property but mere authority;
and that any absolute power of disposal was not inconsistent with a life estate.
32 In several states, statutes have been enacted which in some measure
impinge upon this problem. These sections are all similar varying but
slightly in language and are prototypes of the original New York statute on
the matter. In substance they provide that when an absolute power of dis-
posal, not accompanied by a trust, shall be given to the owner of a particular
estate for life or for years such an estate shall be changed into a fee abso-
lute with respect to creditors, purchasers and encumbrancers, but subject
to any future estates limited thereon in case the power should not be exe-
cuted or the land should not be sold for the satisfaction of debts; that when
a like power of disposal shall be given to one to whom no particular estate
has been limited, such person shall also take a fee subject to any future
estates limited thereon, but absolutely with respect to creditors, purchasers,
and encumbrancers.
However such statutes do not affect materially the central problem under
consideration here because they do not change the status of the parties to
the will or deed. Such has been the construction placed upon them. New
York, for instance, in which the statute originated, still deals with a con-
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II. THE MissouRi CASES
It has been said that in Missouri a limitation to A and his heirs
with full power to convey or devise a fee and with a proviso that
if the power is not exercised the land shall go over to B and his
heirs creates a fee in A, the subsequent limitation being void.33
It is also true in this state that a limitation to A for life, remainder
over with a complete power of disposal annexed is not enlarged
to a fee by reason of the power.34  As to the latter proposition
there can be no doubt that Missouri is in accord with the majority
rule as stated above. Clearly, if there has been a grant of a life
estate expressly made, that life estate will not enlarge. In such
a case there would be a valid contingent remainder following a
life estate. If the primary estate is, on the other hand, a fee, the
subsequent estate can only be an executory limitation and its
validity must rest upon whatever fate is accorded to executory
limitations. It becomes apparent therefore that the two sep-
arate problems referred to in the introduction exist in this state.
In the early case of Ruby v. Barnett35, it was held that the
widow took a life estate under a devise to her as follows: "It is
my will that my wife . . .shall have all my property . . . as
long as she shall live." This case has been cited as authority for
both of the above stated rules in this state, but the court was
addressing itself solely to the problem of the wife's estate. The
court in this case determined the nature of the primary devise.
In arriving at its decision the court seems to be thoroughly in line
with the general American view, and on principle, it is correct,
since the will expressly used the terms of a life estate-namely
"as long as she shall live". But the court seems to have gone
farther than the later cases have wished to follow in establish-
ing by way of dictum the rule of Jackson v. Robins,36 which it
cited. The court said, "It always has been held that an abso-
troversy between the devisees according to the majority rule which it had
adopted in its decisions prior to the passage of the statute. Therefore, this
brief reference is made here only for the sake of completeness. Ala. Code
(1923) sec. 6928; G. S. Minn. (1923) sec. 8115; C. S. N. Y. (Cahill 1930)
ch. 51, sec. 150; Okla. Stat. (1931) sec. 11877. Missouri has no such statute.
Some of the recent cases construing this type of statute are: Showalter v.
Showalter (1928) 217 Ala. 418, 116 So. 116; Larson v. Mardaus (1927) 172
Minn. 48, 215 N. W. 196; Stafford v. Washburn (193) 208 N. Y. 536, 101
N. E. 1102; Watkins v. French (1931) 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300; Zweifel's
Will (1927) 197 Wis. 428, 216 N. W. 840.
a Hudson, op. cit. 1. c. 37. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 563.
34 Ibid. 38.
35 (1848) 12 Mo. 5.
.16 Note 20 above.
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lute power of disposition over property conferred by will not con-
trolled by any provision or limitation, amounted to an absolute
gift of the property. A power to dispose of a thing as one
pleases must necessarily carry with it a full property in it.
Hence whenever property is conveyed in words conferring a
power of disposition as one pleases, or as he may think best, it is
in law an absolute gift of the property to him on whom the power
of disposition is conferred. . . .But a devise to a wife for life,
and after her decease she to give the same to whom she will,
passes but an estate for life with a power; yet if an express estate
for life had not been given to the wife, an estate in fee would
have passed by the other words." This dictum seems to have been
followed in Gregory v. Cogwel13 7. In McDowell v. Brown38, there
was a primary estate in fee followed by an executory limitation
contingent upon the non-execution of a power by the first taker.
The language creating the primary estate was clear; thus the
court was plainly faced with a problem-not of the nature of the
primary estate-but with the validity or invalidity of an execu-
tory limitation conditioned upon the exercise of a power of dis-
posal by the holder of the primary estate. The court held the
limitation invalid. This case was followed a few years later by
Jecko v. TaussigS.9. In this case an estate was granted to the
first taker in general terms (there was no express language indi-
cating either a fee or a life estate) with a power of disposal an-
nexed. The court was faced solely with the problem of the
power of the first taker to dispose of a fee, and as Professor
Hudson points out 40 , whether the subsequent limitation was a re-
mainder or an executory limitation makes little difference in the
actual decision reached. But Professor Hudson thinks that this
case is an implied recognition of a contingent executory limita-
tion because the court referred to it as being "contingent upon,
the non-exercise of the power". But it is not altogether clear in
many states whether such a subsequent estate is a contingent
remainder, or a vested remainder subject to divestiture. The
court could have been thinking of contingent remainders instead
37 (1854) 19 Mo. 415,
as (1855) 21 Mo. 57. This seems to be the distinction upon which the seem-
ing inconsistency, so deplored by Mr. Gill can be resolved. Whether or not
an executory limitation conditioned upon non-exercise of a power of disposal
should or should not be valid is one matter. But it is an entirely different
matter to lump all "subsequent" devises together and call them "limita-
tions" and then point to a variance in the treatment of them with an almost
naive disregard for distinctions in their legal nature.
39 (1869) 45 Mo. 167.
40 Hudson, op. cit. 1. c. 39 ftn. 155.
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of contingent executory limitations, and in the light of the Mc-
Dowell case it seems that this is more likely. Furthermore,
subsequent cases have borne this out. In Harbison v. James41,
there was a devise in general terms with a power of disposal and
a gift over of all "property undisposed of". This, it was held,
created a life estate in the widow and a valid gift over by way of
remainder. The court determined from the whole will that the
primary estate was a life estate and that it was not enlarged
to a fee by the annexation of the power. Likewise in McMillan
v. Farrow4 2 there was a gift in the primary devise, to the wife of
the testator, to hold absolutely with full power to dispose of all
or any part thereof at her option. Following this clause there
was a gift over of all property undisposed of at her death. The
court said that it could not be that if the testator had intended to
give her the property in fee, he would have said "my property
remaining undisposed of at her death". Such a construction
would make the provisions of the will inconsistent with each
other, whereas, when construed as giving her a life estate only,
the provisions were perfectly consistent and in harmony. This,
it will readily be seen, is an adoption of the tendency of the courts
in the majority rule states to determine the nature of the primary
estate by reference to the testator's intention as it appears from
the whole will4 3. In fact, the Missouri court has gone rather
far in this direction in the more modern cases. It must be noted
that the primary devise can be phrased in three different ways.
It can grant a life estate to the first taker expressly, it can grant
an estate to the first taker in general terms which do not ex-
pressly indicate either a life estate or an absolute interest, or it
41(1886) 90 Mo. 411.
42 (1897) 141 Mo. 55, 41 S. W. 890.
43 The cases seem to bear out the application of this "rule of intention".
Garland v. Smith (1901) 164 Mo. 1, 64 S. W. 188 (in trust for the wife's sole
and separate use held to create a life interest in wife) ; Underwood v. Cave
(1903) 176 Mo. 1, 75 S. W. 451; cf. Threlkeld v. Threlkeld (1911) 238 Mo.
459, 141 S. W. 1121 (absolute power of disposal not inconsistent with a life
estate) ; Gibson v. Gibson (1912) 239 Mo. 490, 144 S. W. 770; (a leading case
on this subject which reviews the authorities and seems to support the indi-
cated analysis) ; Burnett v. Burnett (1912) 244 Mo. 491, 148 S. W. 872 (an-
other case to same effect, but which mainly construes the nature and effect
of the power); Trigg v. Trigg (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 1011; Cook v. Higgins
(1921) 290 Mo. 402, 235 S. W. 807; Bowles v. Shocklee (Mo. 1925) 276 S. W.
17. Although the significance of intention is peculiarly great in the case
of wills, the application of this principle of construction has so colored the
whole treatment of the instant problem that, it is submitted, the courts will
react very similarly when it arises out of a trust instrument or deed. See
Rayl v. Golfinopolus (Mo. 1924) 264 S. W. 911; Garland v. Smith, supra.
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can grant an absolute interest to the first taker in express terms
(which standing alone would clearly convey a fee simple). In
the first two situations the result which the court achieves is not
only clear, but satisfactory. But there are cases in this state, in
which the primary devise is couched in terms clearly importing a
fee. For instance in Bowles v. Shocklee 44 the devise gave to the
widow all testator's property "absolutely." There were several
repetitions of this language. Yet, the court held that the will, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the testator as they
appeared in the evidence, gave to the widow a life estate with
power to sell as she might deem best and proper.45 It may be
hard to justify the court's decision in holding such primary de-
vise to be life estate in the face of the express language em-
bodied in the devise which would seem to create a fee. But on
the whole it was probably not the testator's intention to create a
fee simple absolute. This he could have done, and most probably
would have done, by the simplest of language. The fact that he
added the power of disposal, and the gift over of the undisposed
portion at the death of the first taker, patently reveals some other
and different purpose. Indeed when such testamentary para-
graphs are read it will appear that in all probability the testator,
in using the "absolute" terminology merely desired to insure the
first taker of an absolute freedom to dispose of the property dur-
ing the latter's lifetime.
It is true that this extension does not leave much room for the
existence of a primary estate which is a fee simple absolute, with
an executory limitation contingent upon non-disposal by the first
taker. In other words, such an extension would go very far to-
wards minimizing the importance of the second problem referred
to in the introduction-that of the validity of an executory devise
contingent upon non-disposal by the first taker. While the cases
which indicate a trend in the direction of this liberal extension
are few, it is entirely possible for the courts to avoid the invalidity
of the subsequent limitation by construing the primary estate to
be one for life whereupon the subsequent limitation becomes a re-
mainder. Of course it may still fall as a remainder, if the re-
maindermen are unascertainable. The determination of the
nature of the primary estate is by no means a magic touchstone.
But such an analysis of the cases will lead to a practical appre-
ciation of their relative significance and will furnish a valuable
method of legal technique, a thing which is much needed by any
44 (Mo. 1925) 276 S. W. 17.
45 There are other cases of a similar variety but it would be redundant to




lawyer who attempts to thread his way through the maze of ap-
parently conflicting principles which surround the determination
of the rights of the parties when the deed or will contains limita-
tions of the nature here involved. The proper application of this
technique shows that the Missouri courts have definitely adopted
more or less complete power of disposition; that they are very
liberal in interpreting ambiguous terminology so as to give the
first taker a life estate rather than a fee simple; and that seeming
conflict among the cases involving limitations of this type can be
resolved upon this basis. ALFRED W. PETCHAFT, '33.
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